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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ALBERT DENNIS ZAMPEDRI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030579-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * is 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for attempted aggravated murder, a first degree 
felony, and attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-202 (Supp. 2001), § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2000), & § 76-4-101 (1999). The Utah Supreme 
Court transferred the appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted of 
attempted aggravated murder, or alternatively, of attempted murder, if he "knowingly or 
intentionally" attempted to cause the deaths of the two officers? 
Standard of Review. Where no objection is made at trial to jury instructions, this 
Court will review those instructions on appeal only "to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(e); accord State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, «|[ 39, 82 P.3d 1106. Manifest justice is 
determined using the plain error standard. Casey, 2003 UT 33, ^  40-41. 
2. Was the evidence sufficient for the jury to find that defendant acted with the 
mental states required for attempted aggravated murder and attempted murder? 
Standard of Review. Where the sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged at trial, 
this Court will review an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence only for plain 
error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ffi[ 16-17, 10 P.3d 346. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) is relevant to a determination 
of this case, as is section 76-4-101 as amended by S.B. 143,2004 Utah Legislative Session, 
which was enacted to clarify the original statute. 2004 Utah Laws Ch. 154 (S.B. 143) (eff. 
May 2,2004) is reproduced in Addendum A. The original statute and the amended statute 
are set forth below: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (as amended by 2004 Utah Laws Ch. 154 (S.B. 143)) 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he 
acts with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it 
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted aggravated murder, both first 
degree felonies, and misdemeanor counts of assault, possession of a dangerous weapon with 
intent to assault, and carrying a dangerous weapon while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs. R. 1-3. Defendant was bound over for trial on all charges. R. 17-19; R. 242: 49. 
Following a four-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted aggravated murder and 
attempted murder. R. 147,243-46. The jury found defendant not guilty of assault. R. 148, 
243-46. Defendant was not tried on the remaining two misdemeanor counts. See R. 147-48. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of five years-to-life for attempted 
aggravated murder and one-to-fifteen years for attempted murder. R. 169-70. Defendant 
timely moved for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a 
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particular defense. R. 172-78. The motion was denied. R. 221-28. Defendant timely filed a 
notice of appeal. R. 218, 233-35. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002). 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On November 16, 2001, defendant was released from the Weber County Correctional 
Facility after having served a six-month jail term. R. 244: 51-52; R. 245: 188. While in jail, 
both his home and business went into foreclosure. R. 244: 52-53, 82; R. 245: 185, 188-89. 
At the request of defendant's son and estranged wife, defendant's neighbors—Richard and 
Sharlene Malan—helped move some of defendant's property and equipment from both the 
business and the home. R. 244: 81. They also cured the default on defendant's home by 
arranging with his estranged wife to purchase the home. R. 244: 82-85, 88, 97, 103. 
However, defendant did not agree to the sale and accused the Malans of stealing his property. 
R. 244: 87-88, 96-101. 
On December 2,2001, about two weeks after his release, defendant flagged down the 
Malans as they were returning home from church in their pickup truck. R. 243: 101; R. 244: 
56-58, 89-90. The conversation was pleasant at first, as the two men discussed the 
whereabouts of defendant's tools and equipment. R. 244: 59, 91. However, in the midst of 
that discussion, defendant looked at Mrs. Malan and asked, "What is wrong with you?" R. 
244: 59, 91. She replied that she wanted the $9,400 back that the Malans had paid on 
defendant's house. R. 244: 60, 91. Defendant turned around, stuffed a handful of snow in 
his mouth, turned back around, and declared, "I'm so mad I could just piss." R. 244: 64, 92. 
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Mr. Malan replied, "Go ahead," to which defendant replied, "You want me to rip this door 
open and kick your ass?" R. 244: 64, 92. He then opened the truck door and tried to pull 
Malan out of the truck. R. 243: 101-02; R. 244: 65, 92. Mr. Malan grabbed defendant and 
pushed him against the steering wheel. R. 244: 65-66, 93. When defendant went limp, Mr. 
Malan let him go, whereupon defendant left the truck and disappeared behind his house. R. 
244:66-67,93. During the struggle between the two men, Mrs. Malan telephoned 9-1-1 and 
reported the assault. R. 244: 92. 
Officers Gary Worthen of the Harrisville Police Department and Corey Clark of the 
Pleasant View Police Department both arrived at the scene some five to ten minutes later. R. 
243: 91, 94-95, 97; R. 244: 67-68, 95, 108. After Officer Worthen talked to Mrs. Malan 
about what happened, he attempted to contact defendant by knocking on his front door. R. 
243:102-03; R. 244:110-12. When no one responded, Officer Clarkjoined Officer Worthen 
at the front steps and reported that Mrs. Malan said that defendant had entered in through the 
back door. R. 243: 103; R. 244: 112. The two officers walked around the house and 
knocked on the back door, but again no one responded. R. 243:105-08; R. 244:68-69,112-
14. Officer Worthen noticed fresh footprints in the snow leading away from the house. R. 
243: 108; R. 244: 114. After instructing Officer Clark to remain at the house, Officer 
Worthen followed the footprints through the gate to a chicken coop. R. 243:109-11; R. 244: 
15, 116-17. 
Removing his pistol and hiding it beside his leg, Officer Worthen approached the 
chicken coop and called out to defendant. R. 243: 114-15; R. 244: 17, 117. When no one 
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answered, he opened the door to the chicken coop about half-way and stepped in. R. 243: 
113-17; R. 244: 17, 117. As he scanned the chicken coop, defendant arose from behind a 
barrier of miscellaneous objects with a .32 caliber rifle to his shoulder, which he pointed 
directly at Officer Worthen's face. R.243:117-18,121,132; R. 244:18-19,247; R. 245:43, 
77. Officer Worthen immediately dropped to the ground. R.243: 123,127; R. 244: 39. As 
Officer Worthen dropped to the ground, defendant fired the gun at him, but missed. R. 243: 
123-24; R. 244: 11, 118; R. 245: 76-77, 99-100, 119-20. Defendant fired his rifle a second 
time, again missing. R. 243: 124-25,134; R. 244: 69. Officer Worthen returned fire twice, 
scrambled to his feet, shot a third round toward defendant as cover, and fled from the 
chicken coop. R. 243: 124-25, 128-29,134; R. 244: 69, 119-20, 133; R. 245: 63. After 
taking cover behind a nearby tree, Officer Worthen radioed that shots had been fired. R. 
243: 130-31; R. 244:143. On hearing the shots, Officer Clark scrambled for cover behind a 
corner of the house and likewise reported the shooting. R. 244: 120, 122, 133. 
Defendant sporadically fired his gun toward the officers. R. 243: 134-36; R. 244:25, 
121, 129-30, 138, 192-94, 222. One round went through the passenger- and driver-side 
windows ofOfficer Clark's patrol car and hit a house. R.243:134-36; R. 244:25,121,129-
30,138,192-94, 222; R. 245: 59-65. When Officer Clark peeked around the corner to see if 
he could locate Officer Worthen, defendant fired the rifle at him, narrowly missing his head 
and hitting the brick instead. R. 243: 137-42; R. 244: 123-26, 133-37, 141-42; R. 245: 58. 
For close to an hour, Officer Worthen tried to negotiate defendant's surrender. R. 
243: 133, 144; R. 244: 120-21, 181-82. Using a torrent of vulgarities, defendant refused, 
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repeatedly threatening to shoot Officer Worthen and maintaining that the officer would have 
to come in and get him. R. 243: 143-45; R. 244: 24-25, 36, 122, 131-32, 139-40, 224. In 
response to Officer Worthen's queries about defendant's well-being, defendant alternately 
claimed that he had been shot and that he had not been shot. R. 244: 153-54. Defendant 
further complained that police had "taken everything away" from him. R. 243: 144-45; R. 
244: 24-25, 36, 122,131-32,139-40,148-49,181-82, 224. Although defendant also stated 
that he wanted to die, he never presented himself to be shot by police. R. 243: 132-34,146; 
R.244: 128, 181,226. 
When Chief Max Jackson arrived on the scene, defendant agreed to speak with him. 
R.243:146-48; R.244: 125-26,221,225. Chief Jackson joined Officer Worthen behind the 
tree and attempted to negotiate defendant's surrender. R. 243:149-50; R. 244:182,225-26. 
Defendant rebuffed Chief Jackson's attempts, demanding that "you f.'ers just come in here 
andgetme." Rv243: 150-51; R. 244: 182-83,226-27. When it became evident that he was 
making no progress with defendant, Chief Jackson retreated from his position at the tree and 
drove to the police station about two blocks away where he briefed the S.W.A.T. commander 
and met with a crisis negotiator. R. 243: 150-51; R. 244: 182-83, 227-28. A few minutes 
later, Officer Worthen also retreated from the scene and joined Chief Jackson at the station. 
R. 243: 151-52; R. 244: 183-84, 228. 
Chief Jackson returned to the scene approximately twenty minutes later. R. 244:228. 
Another hour or so later—after the S.W.A.T. team was in position and one of defendant's 
friends had arrived—Chief Jackson entered defendant's home and reinitiated contact with 
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him through a bullhorn. R. 244: 165-66, 184-85,216,228-31. During this time, defendant 
complained that he had lost everything, spewed a "hail of expletives," and blamed the 
Harrisville Police Department, particularly Chief Jackson, for his troubles. R. 244:165-66, 
231-32. Chief Jackson told defendant that they could work things out, but defendant would 
not surrender—afraid that police would shoot him if he did. R. 244: 186-88. 
After some thirty to forty minutes, Chief Jackson gave the bullhorn to defendant's 
friend, who also asked defendant to put his gun down and come out. R. 244: 185-186,232-
33. At first, defendant asked that his friend leave, but he was eventually persuaded to come 
out after his friend came outside. R. 244:185-86,233-34. Defendant emerged from the door 
with his hands above his head, but as he did so, he removed a .22 pistol from a shoulder 
holster. R.244:166-67,188-89,200-01,212,234-35. Several officers immediately alerted 
that he had a gun and Chief Jackson yelled at him to put it down. R. 244: 167-68, 189,234-
35. Defendant ran back inside the coop exclaiming, "No, no, no, I'm just going to put the 
gun down." R. 244: 167-68, 189, 234-35. 
After defendant retreated into the chicken coop, Chief Jackson resumed negotiations. 
R. 244: 168-69, 190. Chief Jackson told defendant that since he had not shot anyone, they 
would let him off with a citation. R. 244: 170, 187-88, 238. After some twenty minutes of 
further negotiation, defendant stepped out of the chicken coop with his hands in the air, again 
expressing fear for his safety because of all the weapons aimed at him. R. 244: 238. Chief 
Jackson reassured defendant they would not shoot him. R. 244:23 8-40. Defendant became 
alarmed, however, when he saw additional officers with their sights trained on him. R. 244: 
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240-41. Chief Jackson directed the officers to bring their guns to "low ready." R. 244:241. 
When defendant insisted that Chief Jackson come out, he was directed to lift his vest so 
officers could verify he had no concealed weapons. R. 244: 241. Chief Jackson and 
defendant then walked toward each other until they met and shook hands. R. 244:169,190-
91,208-09,241-42. 
As they shook hands, two members of the S.W.A.T. team advanced on the shed. R. 
244:209. When defendant saw them, he turned, took a couple of steps back, and demanded 
that they stay away from his guns. R. 244: 209, 242. At that point, Chief Jackson and a 
number of other officers converged on defendant and arrested him. R. 244: 156,169,191-
92, 209, 243-44. During his takedown, defendant appeared to reach for a knife that he 
carried in a sheath, but was prevented from doing so by Chief Jackson. R. 244: 243-44. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Attempt Instructions. Defendant contends that his convictions should be reversed 
because the jury was instructed that he could be convicted upon a finding that he 
"intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the deaths of the officers. Because he did 
not object to the instructions, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred, (2) the 
error was obvious, and (3) the error was prejudicial. He has met none of the requirements. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has subsequently held that attempted murder 
requires an "intentional" mens rea showing, the legislature has since amended the attempt 
statute to clarify that attempt can be found upon a mens rea showing of either intentional or 
knowing. Because the amendment is a clarifying amendment, it is applied retroactively in 
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this case. As such, the trial court committed no error. Assuming arguendo that the court 
erred in its instructions to the jury, any such error was not obvious. The supreme court's 
decision holding that an attempt can only be committed upon a showing of intentional 
conduct was issued after the trial in this case. As such, the trial court was guided by 
decisions dating back twenty years that recognized an "intentional or knowing" attempted 
murder. Accordingly, any error was not obvious. Finally, defendant was not harmed in any 
event because only two version of facts was presented to the jury. The State claimed that 
defendant intended to cause the officers' deaths and defendant claimed that he shot away 
from the officers hoping they would be provoked into shooting him. No evidence was 
presented supporting a theory that defendant knew he would kill the officers hoping they 
would subsequently shoot him. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish the mens rea element for attempted murder. This claim also fails. Before the 
officers' arrival, defendant armed himself with two loaded firearms and additional 
ammunition and retreated into a chicken coop behind some barrels. Defendant fired at both 
officers, narrowly missing them. Defendant also challenged the officers to come in and get 
him. His language and tone was menacing and combative. Finally, he repeatedly told one of 
the officers that he was going to shoot him. The foregoing evidence was more than 
sufficient to establish that defendant acted knowingly and intentionally. Accordingly, 
defendant's plain error and ineffective assistance claims based on insufficient evidence fail. 
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ARGUMENT 
NO MANIFEST INJUSTICE RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT ATTEMPT MAY 
INCLUDE ONLY A "KNOWING" MENS REA. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could 
convict defendant of the attempted aggravated murders, or alternatively, the attempted 
murders, of Officers Worthen and Clark if it found, among other things, that he 
"intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the officers' deaths. Aplt. Brf. at 20,25-32; 
see R. 104-12, 126 (Instr. 13-15, 29). Defendant acknowledges that this claim was not 
preserved below. Aplt. Brf. at 29-31. However, he asserts that he is entitled to relief under 
the "manifest injustice" exception. Aplt. Brf. at 29-32. He is incorrect.1 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[u]nless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error 
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). In State v. Casey, 2003 UT 
33, 82 P.3d 1106 {Casey II), the Utah Supreme Court held that when reviewing a claim of 
manifest injustice under rule 19(e), the appellate court "examines the contested jury 
instructions under the plain error test.. . ." 2003 UT 33, f 41. Under that test, the appellant 
A defendant may also obtain appellate review of an unpreserved claim upon a 
showing of "exceptional circumstances." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16,497 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Defendant has not, however, asserted "exceptional circumstances" and 
this Court should not therefore address that exception on appeal. See State v. Hodges, 2002 
UT 117, | 5, 63 P.3d 66 (refusing to address defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim 
because defendant had asserted neither exception on appeal). 
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must demonstrate that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [the Court's] confidence in 
the verdict is undermined." The Supreme Court in Casey II emphasized that the appellate 
court "will remand [the] case for a new trial only if each element of the test is met" Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Like defendant here, the appellant in Casey //challenged, for the first time on appeal, 
a jury instruction instructing the jury that it could convict the defendant of attempted murder 
if it found that he "intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the death of another. Id. 
at f 43 (emphasis in original). And like the appellant in Casey II, defendant cannot meet all 
three requirements of the plain error test. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR. 
In State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 29 P.3d 25 {Casey /), decided June 28, 2001, 
this Court held that "the required mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5-
203(l)(a) is 'intent or knowledge.'" Casey /, 2001 UT App 205, \ 27. A little more than 
two years later—after the trial in this case—theUtah Supreme Court in Casey II overruled 
that holding, concluding that "in order to convict a defendant of attempted murder, the 
prosecution must establish that the defendant acted intentionally; it is not enough that he or 
she acted knowingly." Casey II, 2003 UT 33, ffif 38, 51} 
Casey //was originally filed on September 9,2001. An amended opinion was filed 
on December 5, 2003. 
12 
The State acknowledges that under Casey II, an "intentional" mens rea showing is 
required to convict someone of attempted murder. However, recent legislation amending the 
attempt statute requires a different result. Although the amendment was introduced and took 
effect after Casey II, it applies retroactively to this case because it merely clarified the 
ambiguities in the original statute. 
As a general rule, amendments to existing laws are understood as "changing existing 
legal rights and liabilities" and may not be applied retroactively. State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 
1233,1234 (Utah App. 1990); accordUteh Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) (providing that "[n]o 
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"). However, an 
exception to this rule exists "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of 
an earlier enactment." Dep't of* Social Services v. Higgs, 656P.2d998, 1001 (Utah 1982). 
An amendment "not expressly characterized as a clarification carries the rebuttable 
presumption that it is intended to change existing legal rights and liabilities." Amador, 804 
P.2d at 1234. On the other hand, an amendment will be interpreted as a clarification of the 
law and applied retroactively if it is expressly characterized as a clarification in the 
legislation or if the presumption against such a characterization is rebutted by other evidence 
of legislative intent. See id. at 1234; State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1167 & n.4 (Utah App. 
1997) (looking to legislative comments in deciding that amendments clarified existing law). 
In the legislative session following Casey II, the Utah Legislature amended the 
attempt statute. See S.B. 143, 2004 General Session (enrolled copy) (eff. May 3, 2004), 
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available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2004/bills/sbillenr/sb0143 .htm (Addendum A). The 
original attempt statute, interpreted by the Casey II court, stated: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2) (1999). The amended statute, which took effect on May 
3, 2004, provides: 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the crime; and 
(b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts 
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that 
result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it 
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
S.B. 143.3 The amended statute thus abrogates the holding in Casey II, permitting a 
conviction for attempt where a defendant acts either "intentionally" or "knowingly." 
The express language of the bill adopting the amendment and the historical 
circumstances giving rise to its passage demonstrate that the amendment did not change 
substantive law, but clarified the meaning of the original statute. 
Other stylistic changes were made in subsection (3) of the statute. See S.B. 143. 
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In its preamble introducing the amendment, the bill states: 
General Description: 
This bill clarifies the elements of an attempt to commit an offense. 
Highlighted Provisions: 
This bill: 
• clarifies that an attempt to commit a crime includes situations where the 
defendant is aware that his actions are reasonably certain to cause a result that 
is an element of the offense; and 
• clarifies that a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step toward 
committing a crime if the conduct strongly corroborates the defendant's 
awareness of his actions as described above. 
S.B. 143 (emphases added). The bill, therefore, explicitly characterized the amendment as a 
clarification. The amendment, therefore, is not a substantive change to the existing attempt 
statute, but a clarification that it includes a "knowing" attempt. Because the amendment 
"'construes and clarifies'" the prior attempt statute, this Court should "'accept[ ] [it] as the 
legislative declaration of the original act.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting/rc reD.B., 925 P.2d 178, 182 n.5 (Utah App. 1996)). 
The historical timing of the amendment also supports a conclusion that it was merely 
intended to clarify the original meaning of the statute. Since at least 1982, Utah courts have 
recognized an "intentional or knowing" attempted murder. In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 
903,904-05 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the crime of attempted murder 
for "intentionally or knowingly" attempting to cause the death of another—rejecting the 
defendant's argument that attempted murder requires a "specific intent" to kill another. Ten 
years later in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 1992), the supreme court refused to 
recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder. In doing so, the court 
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rejected part of the reasoning of Maestas. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5. However, the court 
emphasized that "Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted 
aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or 
attempted murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 75-5-203(l)(a)." 
Id. 
Following Vigil, Utah courts continued to recognize an "intentional or knowing" 
attempted murder. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1157 (Utah 1991) (upholding 
attempted murder conviction because "[t]he jury could certainly [have] inferred] from 
[defendant's] statements . . . that [defendant] administered the [poison] with the necessary 
intent or knowledge"); State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,23 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that only 
remaining question for jury was whether defendant "had the intentional or knowing state of 
mind required for conviction of attempted murder"); State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 
(Utah 1997) (comparing the penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner with that for 
"attempted murder, which also requires an intent to kill or a knowledge that one's acts would 
result in death if carried out"); Casey 1,2001 UT App 205, f^ 27 (recognizing an "intentional 
or knowing" attempted murder). 
Casey II, therefore, represents a departure from some twenty years of Utah case law 
recognizing attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" formulation of the statute. 
Against this background, the Utah Legislature amended the attempt statute in the legislative 
session immediately following Casey II See S.B. 143 (Bill Status), available at 
http://wwrw.le.state.utus/-2004/status/sbillsta/sb0143 .htm. The timing of the amendment, on 
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the heels of Casey II, supports the conclusion that the legislature was clarifying a statute, 
which had, for the first time, mistakenly been interpreted to exclude a "knowing" attempted 
murder. In short, the 2004 amendment can only be construed as a "reaffirmation of a long-
standing rule—a clarification—and not the intentional reversal of a [6-month] aberration." 
City ofKanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1069 n.3 (Utah App. 1998). 
Because the amended statute applies retroactively to this case, the trial court did not 
err in giving the attempt instructions. 
B. ANY ERROR WAS NOT OBVIOUS 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, a finding 
of error only "begins [the Court's] analysis under the plain error test." Casey II, 2003 UT 
33, Tf 43. The Court must still "determine whether th[e] error was obvious and whether it 
was of sufficient magnitude to constitute plain error." Id. An error is obvious only if, 
"'given the circumstances, the trial court should have been aware that an error was being 
committed at the time.5" Id. (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.l 1 (Utah 1989)). 
In Casey II—which addressed an identical claim of plain error—the Supreme Court 
concluded that the inclusion of a "knowing" mens rea in the attempt instruction was neither 
plain, manifest, or obvious given the footnote in Vigil "indicating that 'Maestas is still good 
law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or 
knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(l)(a).'" Id. at 145 (quoting Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 
n.5). As such, the Court held, it "[could not] say that the error should have been plain or 
obvious to the trial court." Id. 
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Likewise, it cannot be said here that the inclusion of a "knowing" mens rea in the 
attempt instructions was obvious. In this case, the trial court was not only guided by the 
footnote in Vigil, but by this Court's decision in Casey I. Relying on Vigil, this Court 
"conclude[d] that the required mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5-
203(l)(a) is intent or knowledge."5 Casey I, 2001 UT App 205, ffif 17-14, 27. Although at 
the time of trial in this case the Utah Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Casey I, its 
decision in that case was still more than a year away. Under those circumstances, the trial 
court was duty bound, even in the face of an objection, to instruct the jury that "the required 
mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5-203(l)(a) is 'intent or knowledge."' 
Id. at U 27. See Martin v. Cain, 206 F.3d 450,456 (5th Cir.) (holding that court is bound by 
precedent until overruled or changed by law), cert, granted, judgment vacated on grounds 
challenged, and case remanded, 531 U.S. 801, 121 S.Ct. 32 (2000); U.S. exrel. Daneffv. 
Henderson, 501 F.2d 1180,1181 (2nd Cir. 1974) (holding that decision where certiorari has 
been granted retains precedential value); United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401,1403 (9th 
Cir.) (holding that it is bound by prior decision even though certiorari has been granted), 
cert, granted, judgment vacated on grounds challenged, and case remanded, 409 U.S 814, 
93 S.Ct. 161 (1972). 
Because any error in the attempt instructions was not obvious, defendant's "manifest 
injustice" exception fails. See Casey II, 2003 UT 33, \ 45. 
18 
C. ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Finally, defendant's argument fails in any event because no harm resulted in this case. 
Under the final prong of the plain error test, defendant '"must show a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more favorable."5 Id. at \ 46 
(quoting Verde, 770 P.2d at 122). Defendant has failed to meet this requirement. 
Officer Worthen testified that after he stepped into the chicken coop, defendant arose 
from behind a barrier of miscellaneous objects with a .32 caliber rifle to his shoulder, which 
he pointed and fired at Officer Worthen's face. R.243:117-18,121-24,132; R. 244: 18-19, 
247; R. 245: 43, 77. Officer Worthen testified that he avoided being shot only by dropping 
to the ground just before defendant pulled the trigger. R.243: 123-24; R. 244: 18-19. The 
State introduced evidence showing that the bullet entered the shed wall in a trajectory that 
would have hit Officer Worthen had he not moved. R. 245:76-77. Officer Worthen testified 
that as he scrambled away, defendant fired the rifle at him a second time, but again missed. 
R.243:124-25,134. Officers Worthen and Clark both testified that defendant fired his rifle 
at Officer Clark when Officer Clark peeked out from behind the corner of defendant's house, 
and that the bullet came within two feet of his head. R. 243: 137-42; R. 244: 123-26, 133-
37,141-42. Officer Worthen testified that defendant repeatedly told him that "he was going 
to shoot [him—Officer Worthen].55 R. 243: 144-45; R. 244: 24, 36. 
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was a skilled marksman, would have 
successfully shot the officers had he wished to, and that he only fired the weapon to prompt 
the officers to shoot and kill him. R. 245: 205-06. He testified that when he fired his rifle 
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the first time, he swung the rifle away from Officer Worthen and shot through the wall 
"because if it was straight on, [he] didn't wanna [sic] hit him." R. 245: 202, 213, 234. He 
testified that he carefully placed his shots so as not to hit the officers. R. 245: 205. He 
testified that when he shot at Officer Clark, he "knew exactly where it was going," i.e., that 
the round would miss the officer and hit the house. R. 245:206-07,243. Defendant further 
testified that he "never did take aim at any officer" and that he "wasn't gonna [sic] shoot the 
police." R. 245:210,229. 
The jury was thus asked to decide between two factual versions: the State's version 
that defendant intentionally attempted to kill the officers because he did not want to be 
arrested and defendant's version that he shot away from the officers hoping to provoke them 
into shooting him. On appeal, defendant suggests a third version—that defendant fired the 
rifle knowing he would kill the officers, but intending that they shoot him in response. Aplt. 
Brf. at 28. However, defendant did not suggest such a version below and no evidence was 
presented supporting such a version. Because no evidence was introduced supporting a 
finding of that version of facts, defendant's claim fails. 
If the jury chose to believe defendant, it could not have found that defendant acted 
with a knowing mental state, i.e., that when he fired the rifle "he [was] aware that his 
conduct was reasonably certain to cause [the officers' deaths]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
103(2) (1999). This is because defendant did not claim that he fired at the officers knowing 
that they would be killed, but intending that they would shoot him in response. Rather, he 
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claimed that he fired his rifle away from the officers, intending that they would shoot him in 
response. The jury rejected this claim. 
Where the jury rejected defendant's "suicide by cop" claim—that he shot away from 
the officers hoping that they shoot him—"no rational basis existed upon which [defendant's] 
conduct could be considered knowing but not intentional in light of the evidence submitted at 
trial." Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 47. 
He * * 
Because defendant has not shown obvious, prejudicial error, his manifest injustice 
claim fails. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S 
INTENT TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF OFFICERS WORTHEN AND 
CLARK 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required 
mens rea element for attempt. Aplt. Brf. at 19-20, 24-25, 28-29. He contends that the trial 
court plainly erred in not sua sponte entering a directed verdict of acquittal. Aplt. Brf. at 21-
25. His claim fails. 
Because defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence below, he must 
demonstrate plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, «[fij 13-16, 10 P.3d 346. "[T]o 
establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious 
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f 17. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Holgate recognized that "it is difficult for the court on appeal to 
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dictate when an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial court." Id. However, the Court 
cited "the case in which the State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a 
criminal charge" as an example of the kind of evidentiary defect that warrants reversal under 
plain error. Id. (emphasis in original). No such evidentiary defect was present here. 
As noted above, Officer Worthen testified that defendant aimed his rifle at the 
officer's face and fired at him while he was in the chicken coop. R. 243: 117-18, 121-24, 
132; R. 244:18-19,247; R. 245:43, 77. The officers testified that defendant fired his rifle at 
Officer Clark when Officer Clark peeked out from behind the corner of the house. R. 243: 
137-42; R. 244: 123-26,133-37,141-42. Defendant admitted that after hearing Mrs. Malan 
call for police, he retrieved two loaded firearms and additional ammunition and entered the 
chicken coop behind some barrels. See R. 245: 198-200, 229, 238. Although defendant 
claimed at trial that he wanted to commit "suicide by cop," he never presented himself to be 
shot by police during the standoff. See R. 243: 132-34, 146; R. 244: 128, 181, 226. 
Moreover, Chief Jackson testified that defendant's verbal exchange with police was 
"in a very menacing, mean-spirited tone," which suggested that he "wanted a piece of [Chief 
Jackson] and anybody else." R. 244: 226. The evidence also established that defendant 
challenged the officers to come in and get him. R.243:143-45; R. 244: 24-25,36,122,131-
32,139-40,224; R. 244:226 (yelling to Chief Jackson, "You f.ers just come in here and get 
me"). And perhaps most damning, Officer Worthen testified that defendant repeatedly told 
him that "he was going to shoot [Officer Worthen]." R. 243: 144-45; R. 244: 24, 36. 
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The foregoing evidence was more than sufficient to establish that defendant not only 
"knowingly" attempted to cause the officers5 deaths, but that he "intentionally" attempted to 
cause their deaths. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789, 792 (Utah 1991) (holding jury could 
infer intent from overall circumstances of murder). Defendant, therefore, has failed to show 
any error, much less obvious error and his plain error claim for lack of evidence thus fails. 
Defendant also claims that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not moving 
for a directed verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. This claim also fails because the evidence was 
sufficient and any motion for a directed verdict would have therefore been futile. See State 
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 52 (holding that failure of counsel to make futile 
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted May 5, 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SY S. GRAY ^ 
riTsistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum 
Enrolled Copy S.B. 143 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE ATTEMPT AMENDMENTS 
2004 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: David L. Gladwell 
LONG TITLE 
General Description: 
This bill clarifies the elements of an attempt to commit an offense. 
Highlighted Provisions: 
This bill: 
• clarifies that an attempt to commit a crime includes situations where the defendant is 
aware that his actions are reasonably certain to cause a result that is an element of 
the offense; and 
• clarifies that a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step toward committing 
a crime if the conduct strongly corroborates the defendant's awareness of his actions 
as described above. 
Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
None 
Other Special Clauses: 
None 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
AMENDS: 
76-4-101, as enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 76-4-101 is amended to read: 
76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this partA a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime iff; 
S.B. 143 Enrolled Copy 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of [the offense] 
the crime; and 
(b) (i) intends to commit the crime: or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct [docs not constitute] constitutes a substantial step 
[unless it is strongly corroborative of] if it strongly corroborates the actor's [intent to commit the 
offense] mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) [No] A defense to the offense of attempt [shdi] does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed [had] if 
the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be. 
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